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This is an empirical study of troubled (i.e., PN 4) companies, and their agency 
costs to outsiders who invest in them. The sample consisted of 21 companies 
each in three groups made up ofPN4, positive economic profit and negative 
economic profit companies. The study finds that outside investors in PN 4 
companies incurred extreme agency costs compared to positive economic 
profit companies because of poor governance. Relative to the control group, 
PN 4 companies had higher insider ownership, borrowing, and lower equity 
values. The study highlights the uniqueness of the Malaysian securities law 
that allows corporate insiders to proactively use monitoring mechanisms to 
lower agency costs. 
Keywords'. Troubled companies; corporate governance; Disclosures; Insider 
ownership 
* Second prize winner of MAREF Outstanding Research Paper Award (MORPA 
2005) 
Introduction 
The Asian financial crisis that started in 1997 adversely affected the performance 
of many East Asian economies, including Malaysia. This crisis created an 
environment whereby outside investors were vulnerable to expropriation by 
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insiders (Francis et al. 2002). Consequently, outside investors became more sensitive to 
firms' corporate governance structures that they may have previously ignored (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998). According to Mitton (2000), poor corporate governance in general 
and the lack of disclosures and transparency in particular, were contributing factors that 
exacerbated the Asian crisis. In East Asia, Malaysia is a unique case, partly because it 
rejected the International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package, since the restructuring 
proposed by the IMF would have resulted in greater foreign ownership of many local 
companies. Instead the then prime minister Dato' Dr. Mahathir Mohamad took steps to 
stabilise the economy by raising foreign debt from neighbouring countries, pegging the 
ringgit to the US dollar in September 1998, restricting the trading of Malaysian stocks 
outside of Malaysia, introducing a punitive tax for holding stocks for less than a year, and 
making the unofficial trading of the ringgit illegal (e.g., Poon, 1999). These actions have 
heightened the responsibilities of securities regulators to watch-out for the interests of 
outsiders, who could be taken advantage by insiders because they benefit 
disproportionately by the laws that promote a relationship-based capital market system. 
In March of 1998, Malaysia proactively formed The Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG), and a high-level finance committee to look into establishing a 
framework of corporate governance and setting a code of best practices for the listed 
companies. In 1999, this Committee developed the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance to be administered by the MICG. The Code has been implemented since 2000 
and it is backed by the listing rules of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). The 
popular press in Malaysia taut the use of the best practices in corporate governance, and 
the enforcement of it by regulators as one of the ways to improve financial disclosures 
and promote transparent business reporting to serve minority shareholders. The dilemma 
for regulators would be to identify those governance practices that not only improve 
financial reporting but also contribute to increased firm profitability. 
The regulators' focus on improving local company operations is important because 
one of the major criticisms of those who govern companies traded on emerging markets is 
that majority shareholders, who are closely associated with corporate insiders, act as if 
minority investors capital has no opportunity cost, hence, they do not feel obliged to 
provide a return on it (e.g., Chen et al., 2004; Lee, 2003). Consequently, Lee believes that 
a significant proportion of companies in emerging markets like Malaysia destroy economic 
value. For example, he cites KPMG and The Edge (a leading weekly business report 
published in Malaysia) finding that only 75 companies among the more than 800 companies 
listed on KLSE as at 31 December 2002 had a positive economic profit. Given this dismal 
performance of the majority of companies traded on the KLSE, the securities commission 
(SC) in Malaysia in 2001 decided to become more stringent, and began suspending poorly 
performing companies from trading on the KLSE. 
In Malaysia, listed companies typically do not file for bankruptcy, instead they are 
temporarily suspended and given the chance to restructure before being allowed to trade 
again on the KLSE. The criterion for selecting poorly performing companies for evaluation 
are stated in the regulations referred to as Practice Note 4, as a result those companies 
chosen for delisting are called PN 4 companies. According to the regulation, if a company's 
shareholder equity is negative, and has received a going-concern qualification from the 
auditor or if receivers/special administrators have been appointed over one of its major 
subsidiary, then KLSE could classify it as a PN 4 company. Further, when KLSE begins de-
listing procedures against a company (though it may not automatically mean that it will be 
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permanently de-listed) it results in it being closely monitored by regulators. For example, 
the suspended companies have to regularize its financial condition, which is an essential 
first step in putting together a restructuring plan that has to be approved by the SC and 
the Companies Commission of Malaya. 
The purpose of the study is to investigate whether factors such as governance, 
disclosure, financing, and growth are useful indicators to identify companies that are 
classified as PN 4 companies, and also to identify companies that are likely to be in trouble 
in the future. Specifically, it focuses on exploring these characteristics in the two groups 
(positive and negative economic profit) of companies versus the PN 4 companies, and 
suggests what regulators may consider as poor performance in a relationship-based 
capital market. The objective is to understand what SC in Malaysia is doing to improve 
the quality of the companies traded on KLSE, and see how well it is working to protect 
outside shareholders. As of 30 June, 2004 about 125 companies have been classified as 
affected issuers, but this study focuses on 21 companies that have been suspended from 
trading (http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/listing/pn4cos.htm). However, unlike the 
rest, the 21 PN 4 companies chosen have had their restructuring plans approved by 
regulators, which paves the way for them to apply to resume trading. The investor 
confidence in the PN4 companies is at is lowest when they are classified as such by 
regulators. Therefore, the companies need to find ways to improve, not only their financial 
condition but also the liquidity of their stocks, so that they can eventually begin to trade 
on KLSE (Oh, 2003a). One would expect that the PN 4 companies compared to the rest 
would have the weakest corporate governance and disclosure practices before the 
restructuring processes, and the regulators would expect these companies to put in place 
mechanisms to improve them. The study uses agency theory and the Malaysian 
institutional background to develop and test four hypotheses. 
The study finds that a good corporate government mechanism such as having a 
compensation committee and duality of the role of chairman of the board versus the 
company CEO helps to differentiate companies that generate a positive economic profit 
from the PN 4 companies. Interestingly, we find that firms trading on the KLSE are more 
likely to increase their level of disclosures after they perform poorly than before. 
Additionally, poor debt management and asset growth are also probable causes that 
bring increased attention from securities regulators to these companies. The study argues 
that this increased monitoring by regulators can be viewed as another means of reducing 
the extreme agency costs to outsiders who invest in these troubled companies. 
Literature Review 
La Porta et al. (2000) defines corporate governance as a set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by corporate insiders. The 
degree of expropriation by insiders depends on the investment opportunities available 
and the cost of expropriation to the firm. Johnson et al. (2000) and Durnev and Kim (2003), 
suggest that insiders expropriate more when the market is bad, and take less when the 
market is good. These authors argue that one could address the agency problem between 
outsiders and corporate insiders by imposing a higher cost on expropriation by using 
good corporate governance practices, which may help improve the association between 
the degree of expropriation and the market condition. Lombardo and Pagano (2000) note 
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that outside investors demand a lower rate of return from firms with better corporate 
governance because they need to spend less time and resource monitoring the management 
of the company. Hung and Trezevant (2003) find that better corporate governance is 
associated with less insider trading in Southeast Asia. Specifically, they note that the 
firms controlled by the richest families were the most aggressive in trading on their 
proprietary knowledge. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are particularly important in countries like 
Malaysia that have chosen to promote relationship-based capital market systems that 
suppress the free market price systems and the signals they provide (e.g., Rajan and 
Singales, 1998). Moreover, research has shown that the Malaysia's response to the Asian 
crisis favored listed companies that were aligned with Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir than 
with the Deputy Prime Minister (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Therefore, in order to promote 
investments by minority domestic investors and foreign investors, security regulators in 
Malaysia have a greater vested interest to have regulations that protect the interest of 
outsides from expropriation by insiders. Further, the setting up of the institutions like the 
MICG and PN 4 regulation could be viewed as the means used by the government to 
identify companies with poor governance and operations, which have to be dealt with 
before a crisis worsens in order to maintain and improve investor confidence. These 
arguments lead to the first hypothesis that: 
HI: Poor corporate governance is a significant factor that explains regulators decision to 
suspend companies from the KLSE. 
Empirical evidence has shown that the presence of non-executive directors on the 
board affects the financial performance of companies. Non-executive directors (NED) on 
the board are seen as the check and balance mechanism that enhances a board's 
effectiveness. This is because NEDs have a different set of incentives than executive 
directors, stemming directly from their responsibilities as directors and augmented by 
their equity position (Mangel and Singh, 1993). Fama and Jensen (1983) and Mak (1996) 
also agree with the contention that NEDs play their roles as monitors of management's 
performance. Furthermore, NEDs are also considered to be 'decision experts' (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), independent and not intimidated by the chief executive officer (Weisbach, 
1988), able to reduce managerial consumption of perquisites (Brickley and James, 1987), 
and act as a positive influence over directors' deliberations and decisions (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992). On the other hand, the shortcomings of a high proportion of NEDs on 
boards include stifling strategic actions (Goodstein et al, 1994), excessive monitoring 
(Baysinger and Butler, 1985), lack of business knowledge to be effective (Patton and 
Baker, 1987) and lack of real independence (Demb and Neubauer, 1992). 
Just like in developed economies, in Malaysia board of directors are composed of 
executive and non-executive directors. Therefore, board composition could be an important 
variable that regulators consider, because it will indirectly reflect the role of NEDs, which 
is, more disclosures. For instance, a Malaysian study by Hanifa and Cooke (2002) found 
significant association between voluntary disclosure levels and NEDs/chairman of the 
board. As such, strengthened corporate governance and reporting practices, and the 
improved credibility of financial information that should result, may not eliminate business 
failure in totality, but could provide the "red flag" signals to the regulators. Hence, as with 
past studies, the level of disclosure is considered complimentary governance mechanism 
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that helps to reduce information asymmetry between outsiders and corporate insiders 
(Leuz et al. 2003; Ball et al. 2003; Domowitz et al. 2000). This leads to our second hypothesis 
that: 
H2: The amount of corporate disclosures is a significant factor that explains regulators 
decision to suspend companies from the KLSE. 
A study by Bushman et al., (2004) has found that high ownership concentration and 
board structure are not independent, and that these governance variables are related to 
earnings timeliness and organizational complexity. Specifically, their study shows that 
limited transparency and complexity of firms' operations increase the demand for 
governance mechanisms such as high ownership concentration. This they argue, helps 
to reduce the moral hazard problems between insiders and outsiders. In a Malaysian 
study, Abdual Rahman and Haniffa (2003) found that outside shareholding is an effective 
mechanism for monitoring performance. This leads us to hypothesize that ownership 
concentration will be high in poorly performing firms that disclose less. Generally, the 
research in emerging markets has shown that outsiders realize that managers and families 
routinely employ pyramid ownership structures to give themselves control rights to 
companies that far exceed their proportional cash flow rights (for a review see Denis and 
McConnell, 2003). 
Agency theory suggests that with complex ownership structures, managers and 
insiders may show their willingness to be monitored by creditors such as banks by 
increasing their borrowing (Harvey et al. 2003; Diamond, 1991; Ross, 1977). Specifically, 
Harvey et al's (2003) study finds that in emerging markets, when a firm has extreme 
information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders, the company may use 
debt borrowed in international markets to signal their willingness to be monitored by 
lenders. The later can then serve as a mechanism to correct the misaligned managerial 
incentives too. On the other hand La Porta et al. (2003) argue that domestically issued 
short-term debt is less likely to discourage corporate insiders, because family groups or 
governments typically control the banks and can use debt to further their own ends. 
Unless they are government-linked firms, the Malaysian companies typically do not have 
cosy relationships with their bankers. The PN 4 companies identified to date do not have 
any apparent links to the government, hence, given the need for capital to finance growth 
and the high agency costs to outside equity investors, it is possible that corporate 
insiders will seek to raise a large amount of debt capital. Whether or not such an action 
helps to reduce the moral hazard problems is an empirical issue that will be discussed 
based on our findings. This leads to our third hypothesize that: 
H3: The means used to raise capital, namely the amount of equity versus debt financing, 
is a significant factor that explains regulators decision to suspend companies from 
the KLSE. 
The board-level committee such as the audit committee and the duality of the role of 
the chairman of the board and CEO have been found to be important governance variables. 
It has been suggested that the reputation of the external auditor may be an important 
variable that affects audit committees effectiveness (e.g. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 
1996). A survey by MICG, HAM and Ernst & Young (2000) encompassed all public listed 
companies on the KLSE and Mesdaq found that 99 percent of over 120 respondents 
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complied with the mandatory requirements of having an audit committee with a minimum 
of two-thirds non-executive directors in them. The issue in Malaysia has been that the 
audit market is subject to fee regulation; hence, studies have found that Big Five auditors 
discount audit fee if the client's controlling shareholders possessed effective control 
(Fan and Wong, 2001). Therefore, the outsiders may not consider the appointment of Big 
Five auditors as an effective monitoring mechanism, and other means to strengthen the 
audit committee may be important. 
An equally important board-level committee is the compensation committee whose 
main responsibility is to monitor top management, particularly the CEO compensation 
package (Murphy, 1985). According to Murphy this committee's effectiveness is 
moderated by the role of managerial labor markets. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2002) 
find that the presence of a remuneration committee had no significant impact on top 
management remuneration. This result may be due to the fact that their study was conducted 
on a sample of companies listed on the London stock exchange. Malaysia, unlike England, 
does not have a well developed labor market. Therefore, one could argue that compensation 
committees, particularly in troubled companies, can play a critical role by rewarding 
management by using pay-for-performance contracts. 
One of the key measures of managerial performance and compensation is the 
managers' ability to develop and implement strategies that ensure long-run firm growth. 
Tobin's Q ratio is a measure of a firm's growth opportunities, capturing the effects of a 
company's investment strategies. This implies that the greater the real return on investment, 
the greater the value of Q. Lindberg and Ross (1981) suggest that ranking firms on the Q 
values is similar to ranking them on the basis of expected future cash flows. In a study to 
identify over-investment in industries that had limited investment opportunities, Berger 
and Ofeck (1995) used Tobin's Q. Using a similar approach, Lang and Stultz (1994) found 
that highly diversified firms have significantly lower mean and median Q ratios than 
narrowly diversified firms. These studies suggest that management can influence 
performance governance by affecting the sales growth and asset growth of their 
companies. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis compares PN 4 companies versus those 
companies that earn a positive economic profit, and it states that: 
H4: The availability of growth opportunities to companies is a significant factor that 
explains regulators decision to suspend companies from the KLSE. 
Our view is that it is the combination of poor corporate governance, weak disclosures, 
and extreme use of debt and low growth opportunities that drive regulators to take all the 
'red flag' together and consider classifying them as PN 4 companies. This extreme action 
is taken not only to protect the outside shareholders of the PN 4 companies but also to 
send a warning to the other poorly performing companies. Thus, in addition to comparing 
the PN 4 companies to the best companies, it would be important to compare them to 
those companies that are likely to fail in the near future. 
Sample Selection 
The sample consists of 63 companies of which 21 were classified as PN4 companies, 21 
companies have negative economic profit in 2002, and another 21 comparable companies 
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have a positive economic profit in 2002. The 42 companies with negative and positive 
economic profits were chosen as control groups for the PN 4 companies. They were first 
matched by either a positive or negative economic profit as stated in the 2002 KPMG/The 
Edge's shareholder value awards 2002 (Lee 2003), secondarily they were matched by the 
industry to which they belonged and then by the closeness to the size, that was measured 
by the total assets of the chosen PN4 companies. Additionally, the 21 companies selected 
for this study have had their restructuring plan approved by the authorities between 
January 2002 and May 2004. Upon approval, these companies were released from their PN 
4 classification and their trade restrictions were lifted, which means they can reapply to 
the SC to have their stock traded. 
According to the regulations, Practice Note 4 that took effect on February 15th 2001, 
a listed company that fulfils one or more of the criteria in listing requirements are referred 
as "an affected listed issuer." After being classified under PN 4, an affected listed issuer 
must make an announcement to the KLSE of a plan to regularize its financial condition 
within seven days from the date of this Practice Note or from the date a listed issuer fulfils 
one or more of the criteria prescribed above. Following this disclosure, the company has 
a maximum period of six to twelve months to submit its restructuring plan to the relevant 
authorities for approval, including the SC. Then, it must obtain all approvals necessary 
for the implementation of such a plan within four months from the date of submission. The 
paragraph 8.14(2) of the listing requirements prescribes the following criteria, the fulfilment 
of one or more of which will require a listed company and/or its directors to comply with 
the provisions of this Practice Note: 
a. Deficit in the adjusted shareholders' equity of the listed issuer on a consolidated 
basis; 
b. Receivers and/or managers have been appointed over the property of the listed 
issuer, or over the property of its major subsidiary or major associated company 
which property accounts for at least 70 per cent of the total assets employed of the 
listed issuer on a consolidated basis; 
c. The auditors have expressed adverse or disclaimer opinion in respect of the listed 
issuer's going concern, in its latest audited accounts; or 
d. Special administrators have been appointed over the listed issuer or the major 
subsidiary or major associated company of the listed issuer pursuant to the provisions 
of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 (in English "National Asset 
Management Limited Act 1998."). 
Measurements and Methodology 
Economic Profit Measure 
The KPMG/The Edge's shareholder value awards are given based on their ranking of 
Malaysian companies' economic value management, which requires the computation of 
economic profit for companies listed on the KLSE. The calculation of economic profit 
integrates three aspects of business economics, namely, Net Operating Profit after Tax 
(NOPAT), Invested Capital (IC) and Cost of Capital. The NOPAT figure was derived from 
after-tax net operating profits in order to reflect a true income stream rather than a book-
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accounting stream. The NOPAT figures used were basically earnings before interest, tax 
and amortization (EBITA) less adjusted taxes. To compute the IC of a company, an average 
of its FY2001 closing book values of total debt and total equity and its FY2002 book 
values of total debt and total equity was used. The cost of capital is calculated based on 
its specific weighted average cost of capital, which, in turn, is derived using the weight 
each company has in terms of its market values of debt and equity. According to the 
publishers of the business newsletter - The Edge, to calculate weighted average cost of 
capital in 2002 the risk free rate used was 3.5%, and the average risk premium added to 
obtain the expected market rate of return was around 4.5%. The key measure by which the 
companies were ranked in this study was economic profit, which is EBITA less weighted 
average cost of capital of IC. Lee (2003) emphasized that EP/IC is used because it would 
remove the distortion caused by difference in company size and could be used to rank 
companies based on economic profits1 
Corporate Governance Measures 
The role of NEDs on the board of a company was measured by the number of these 
individuals divided by the total number of directors on the board before restructuring. 
The Cadbury Report recommended that all quoted companies should establish internal 
board sub-committees including a compensation committee and an audit committee. The 
Report particularly argues that audit committees are an important control mechanism that 
ensures that shareholder interests are safeguarded (Cadbury, 1992)2. The Cadbury Report 
argued that the effectiveness of an audit committee depends in part on the quality of the 
non-executive (and hopefully independent) members in it. The quality of audit committee 
members is measured by the amount of independent non-executive directors on the audit 
committee before restructuring. 
Good substitute for internal governance is the quality of the external auditor, extent 
of non-family ownership, and the number of foreign mutual fund companies that have an 
interest in these companies. It is believed that the quality of an audit is higher if a company 
is being audited by any one of the Big Four public accountants relative to those audited 
by smaller firms. Information on the percentage of shares held by family members and 
insiders is used as a reverse measure of non-family ownership, and we refer to this as 
insider ownership. The annual reports of the companies provide information about the 
percentage holding of the top thirty shareholders as well as percentage holding by 
individual directors, which was used to compute the percentage of insider ownership. 
Valuation Measures 
Tobin's Q is a widely used measure to capture the success of the corporate governance, 
and to predict the future success of companies (e.g., Weir et al., 2002; Lindenberg and 
Ross, 1981). It compares the market value of the firm with the replacement cost of the 
firm's assets. It implies that the greater the value of Q, the greater the real return on 
investment. For our study, instead of using an aggregate measure we utilized the individual 
components of Tobin's Q and the factors that have been found to affect it. The components 
include the firm's market value, which is measured by the market value of common stock, 
plus the market value of long term bonds and the book value of preferred stock. The 
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equity market value is the number of outstanding shares times the price per share, and 
debt value of all companies is equal to the total book value of all long term debt at the end 
of the fiscal year 2002. The market value of debt could not be obtained because all these 
companies had obtained private loans. The total assets and liabilities were determined 
from the annual reports that were published before the approval of the company 
restructuring plans. This approach allowed us to use numbers that would not be affected 
by the extensive restructuring these companies would have undertaken to obtain approval 
to be re-listed on KLSE. Given the importance of sales and asset growth for companies in 
dire straits, we also included these variables as separate factors that might help predict 
companies poorly managed growth. Growth was measured by the difference in the book 
value of assets (or sales) in the year before (t) and the year preceding the year of (t-1) 
restructuring. 
Disclosure Index 
The corporate governance reporting model developed in the current research is based 
upon factors identified in national and international best practice guidelines and other 
research studies3. The model considers objective factors based on publicly disclosed 
information. Corporate governance factors are generally divided into two main categories: 
basic corporate governance variables are those items specifically identified by the Code, 
and quality corporate governance variables are value-added items generally proposed by 
other best practices worldwide. It is worth to note that the ultimate objective of this 
corporate governance rating exercise is to encourage the firms to uphold the 'substance 
over form' principle of governance rather than merely a 'box-ticking' process of compliance 
with statutory regulation. 
In this study, unlike the self-assessment questionnaire designed by the Forum for 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2001), and the voluntary disclosure index by Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) and corporate governance questionnaire used in Saldana's (2000) study 
which only provided a dichotomous scale of a "yes" or "no" options, our study's checklist 
is designed so that every individual disclosure is evaluated based on a five point of Likert 
scale. We measure the level of corporate governance reporting based on the extent to 
which companies disclose the relevant information in their annual reports. It classifies the 
contextual factors into eight major groups that simultaneously emphasize the duality of 
practicability and world-class quality reporting goals. However, to keep our disclosure 
index comparable to those used in prior studies, we focused only on the accountability 
and transparency measures, which include both voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
requirements that are accounting related (See appendix A). 
Methodology 
In this study the dependent variable is dichotomous; for the first model, those classified 
as PN 4 companies were coded as 1 and the positive economic profit or good companies 
were classified as 0. For the second model, those companies classified as PN 4 companies 
were coded as 1 and the negative economic profit companies were coded as 0. Additionally, 
the independent variables as measured above are mostly nominal values; hence, we used 
log-linear models and logistic regression analysis to test our hypotheses. Additionally, 
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we used a backward stepwise log-liner regression selection method in order to find a 
model that is parsimonious, fits the data well and most importantly make substantive 
sense (given the many factors and the correlations between them)4. Consequently, as we 
progressed from the governance factors (including the disclosure index) to the valuation 
factors we only retained those variables that were significant in each category in the 
logistic regression, and the tables also report the variables that did not enter the model. 
Results 
Table 1 show the descriptive statistics for each group of companies separately. Compared 
to the two control groups, the PN 4 companies have a significantly higher insider ownership 
(at the 0.01 level). Furthermore, compared to the companies with positive economic profit 
the PN 4 companies have significantly higher sales, debt, and lower equity values. Based 
on these univariate statistics, a cohesive business story would be that the PN 4 companies' 
corporate insiders have grown their sales with lower equity base, and using more debt 
capital. This poor financial management combined with the agency issues probably have 
landed them in trouble compared to positive economic profit companies in the same 
industry. Panel A in both Tables 2 and 3 confirm this, with the insider ownership being the 
most significant (at the 0.05 level) predictor, followed by the number of non-executive 
directors on the audit committee (marginally significant at the 0.08 level) of PN 4 firms 
versus the other two group of companies. Hypothesis HI stated that poor corporate 
governance would be a significant factor that explains regulators decision to suspend 
companies from KLSE. Table 2, Panel A also shows that compared to well-managed 
companies, both the presence of a compensation committee and role duality are key 
corporate governance mechanisms that could be used by regulators to classify companies 
under the PN 4 regulations. More importantly, these two governance mechanisms were 
lacking in the companies that had negative economic profits, which are probably closer to 
meeting the criteria for PN 4 status than the positive economic profit companies. 
Using these governance variables, the governance model in Table 2 correctly classifies 
18 out of the 21 companies with positive economic profit, and 17 out of the 21 PN 4 
companies, with an overall classification accuracy of 83%. The governance model in 
Table 3 correctly classifies 16 out of the 21 companies with negative economic profit and 
15 out of the 21 PN 4 companies, which is an overall classification accuracy of 74%. 
Interestingly, the correlation results in Table 4 suggest that as the companies go from 
positive profit to negative profit to PN 4 companies, the association between non-executive 
directors on the board to non-executive directors on the audit committee goes from 
lacking in significance to being significant. Thus, contrary to our expectations, the PN 4 
and the negative economic profit companies have more non-executive directors on the 
audit committee. Given the audit environment in Malaysia, this probably illustrates how 
proactively insiders act to rectify poor audits by strengthening the audit committees. 
Having more of the non-executive directors who serve on the board also serve on the 
audit committee is probably one of the easiest improvements in governance a company 
can make this will show the outsiders that the company is serious of being monitored to 
lower its agency costs to raise capital. Thus, we conclude that there is strong support for 
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Table 1: Comparison of Company Descriptive Statistics 
(Mean and (Standard Deviation)) 
Governance 
Factors 
Inside Own. 
NonExc.-BOD 
Non Exc. -
Audit Committee 
Role Duality 
Big 4 Audit 
Comp. Comm. 
Disclosure Index 
Valuation Factors 
Assets (millions) 
Sales (millions) 
Asset growth 
Sales growth 
Equity Mkt. 
Value (millions) 
Debt Amt. 
(millions) 
Positive 
Econ. Profit 
41% 
(27%) 
62% 
(15%) 
69% 
(11%) 
20 
13 
16 
41% 
(7%) 
R554 
(609) 
R787 
(1339) 
8.25% 
(0.44%) 
3.14% 
(0.34%) 
R 873.24 
(2248.79) 
R 184.92 
(496.52) 
PN4 
Companies 
68% 
(33%) 
57% 
(23%) 
74% 
(17%) 
13 
13 
7 
46% 
(9.1%) 
R919 
(1520) 
R3392 
(13834) 
0.01% 
(0.45%) 
17.80% 
(1.36%) 
R 83.17 
(94.85) 
R 620.96 
(1648.53) 
Negative 
Econ. Profit 
27% 
(21%) 
56% 
(18%) 
70% 
(10%) 
15 
13 
5 
50% 
(8.8%) 
R917 
(2164) 
R330 
(517) 
0.02% 
(0.42%) 
0.74% 
(0.47%) 
R 860.59 
(2767.13) 
R 247.04 
(707.98) 
Pos. vs. PN4 
t-test/z-test 
0.01 
0.01 
0.39 
0.84 
0.24 
0.84 
0.01 
0.19 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.09 
0.35 
0.31 
0.59 
0.39 
0.01 
0.59 
0.02 
0.63 
0.36 
0.10 
0.00 
0.090.09 
Neg. vs. PN4 
t-test/z-test 
0.01 
0.00 
0.86 
0.59 
0.39 
0.98 
0.52 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.51 
1.00 
0.10 
0.35 
0.99 
0.98 
0.32 
0.84 
0.79 
0.84 
0.74 
0.59 
0.10 
0.01 
0.340.84 
^ M 
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Table 2: Comparing PN 4 Companies Vs Positive Economic Profit Companies 
Panel A - Logit Model Incorporating Governance Factors 
Variable 
Inside Own. 
Non Exe. Audit 
Comp. Committee 
Duality 
Disclosure 
Constant 
Model Chi-Square 
Step Improvement 
B 
0.04 
10.48 
-2.79 
-3.55 
15.77 
-11.56 
S.E. 
0.02 
4.79 
1.31 
1.74 
6.82 
4.56 
Chi-Square 
29.30 
-0.55 
Wald 
4.39 
4.77 
4.59 
4.17 
5.34 
6.42 
df 
df 
5 
1 
Sig 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.04 
0.02 
0.01 
Sig 
0.00 
0.46 
Variables removed at iteration number five were: non executive directors on the board and Big 4 
auditors. 
Panel B - Logit Model Incorporating Financing and Valuation Factors 
Variable 
Inside Own. 
Equity Value 
Debt Value 
Asset Growth 
Constant 
Model Chi-Square 
Step Improvement 
B 
0.20 
-0.09 
0.17 
5.27 
- 1.61 
Chi 
S.E 
0.11 
0.05 
0.05 
5.01 
2.34 
-Square 
47.67 
-0.01 
Variable removed at iteration number twelve was sales 
Wald 
3.02 
2.94 
5.12 
1.10 
0.47 
df 
4 
1 
growth. 
df 
Sig 
0.00 
0.91 
Sig 
0.08 
0.08 
0.05 
0.29 
0.49 
Table 3: Comparing PN 4 Companies Vs Negative Economic Profit Companies 
Panel A - Logit Model Incorporating Governance Factors 
Variable 
Inside Own. 
Non Exe. Audit 
Constant 
Model Chi-Square 
Step Improvement 
B 
0.06 
6.13 
-7.03 
S.E. 
0.00 
3.45 
3.00 
Chi-Square 
20.83 
-2.00 
Wald 
9.56 
3.15 
5.48 
df 
1 
1 
1 
df 
2 
1 
Sig 
0.02 
0.08 
0.02 
Sig 
0.00 
0.16 
Variables removed at iteration number four were: non executive directors on the Board, compensation 
committee, Big 4 auditors, role duality, and disclosure index. 
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(cont.) Table 3: Comparing PN 4 Companies Vs Negative Economic Profit Companies 
Panel B - Logit Model Incorporating Financing and Valuation Factors 
Variable 
Inside Own. 
Equity Value 
Debt Value 
Constant 
B 
0.13 
0.06 
0.13 
-2.02 
SE. 
0.07 
0.03 
0.68 
1.59 
Wald 
3.82 
3.63 
4.69 
1.61 
df 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Sig 
0.05 
0.06 
0.03 
0.20 
Model Chi-Square 
Step Improvement 
Chi-Square 
42.62 
-2.02 
df 
3 
1 
Sig 
0.00 
0.15 
Variable removed at iteration number eleven were asset growth and sales growth. 
Chi-Square df Sig 
Model Chi-Square 
Step Improvement 
47.67 
-0.01 
0.00 
0.91 
Variable removed at iteration number twelve was sales growth. 
Table 4: Correlation Profiles 
Panel A - Positive Economic Profit Companies 
In Own 
NED 
BOD 
NED 
Audit 
Asset 
Growth 
Sales 
Growth 
Equity 
Value 
Debt 
Value 
Comm. 
Comte 
Dis. 
Index 
In Own 
1.00 
-0.27 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.38) 
-0.70 
(0.38) 
-0.22 
(0.17) 
-0.38** 
(0.04) 
-0.16 
(0.25) 
0.03 
(0.44) 
-0.48** 
(0.02) 
NED 
BOD 
1.00 
0.07 
(0.38) 
-0.21 
(0.19) 
0.12 
(0.30) 
-0.07 
(0.38) 
-0.25 
(0.14) 
-0.50** 
(0.02) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
NED 
Audit 
1.00 
-0.21 
(0.45) 
0.10 
(0.33) 
-0.08 
(0.36) 
-0.08 
(0.36) 
0.05 
(0.41) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
Asset 
Growth 
1.00 
0.51*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.41) 
-0.45** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.42) 
-0.11 
(0.32) 
Sales 
Growth 
1.00 
0.02 
(0.47) 
-0.38** 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.43) 
001 
(0.48) 
Equity 
Value 
1.00 
0.36* 
(0.06) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.30* 
(0.09) 
Debt 
Value 
1.00 
0.17 
(0.23) 
0.10 
(0.33) 
Comm. 
Comte 
1.00 
0.40** 
(0.04) 
Dis. 
Index 
1.00 
^m 
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 5 NO. 1, 2006 
(Cont.) Table 4: Correlation Profiles 
Panel B - Negative Economic Profit Companies 
In Own NED NED Asset Sales Equity Debt Comm. Dis. 
BOD Audit Growth Growth Value Value Comte Index 
In Own LOO 
NED -0.52*** 1.00 
BOD (0.01) 
1.00 NED -0.39 "0.46* 
Audit (0.04) (0.02) 
Asset -0.26 -0.09 -0.19 
Growth (0.13) (0.34) (0.21) 
1.00 
Sales 
Growth 
Equity 
Value 
Debt 
Value 
Comm. 
Comte 
Dis. 
Index 
Panel C-
In Own 
NED 
BOD 
NED 
Audit 
Asset 
Growth 
Sales 
Growth 
Equity 
Value 
Debt 
Value 
-0.27 
(0.12) 
-0.28 
(0.11) 
-0.29* 
(0.10) 
-0.34* 
(0.07) 
-0.11 
(0.32) 
0.30* 
(0.09) 
0.30* 
(0.09) 
0.33* 
(0.08) 
0.58*** 
(0.01) 
-0.21 
(0.18) 
- PN 4 Companies 
In Own 
1.00 
-0.12 
(0.31) 
-0.19 
(0.21) 
-0.27 
(0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.44) 
0.13 
(0.29) 
0.15 
(0.26) 
NED 
BOD 
1.00 
0.29* 
(0.10) 
-0.17 
(0.23) 
0.30 
(0.45) 
0.042 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
0.21 
(0.19) 
-0.04 
(0.42) 
-0.11 
(0.31) 
0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.24) 
NED 
Audit 
1.00 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
0.21 
(0.19) 
0.17 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(0.45) 
0.63*** 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
-0.03 
(0.45) 
-0.07 
(0.38) 
0.40** 
(0.04) 
Asset 
Growth 
1.00 
0.22 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.48) 
-0.03 
(0.46) 
1.00 
0.14 
(0.17) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
Sales 
Growth 
1.00 
0.83*** 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.23) 
1.00 
0.98*** 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.32) 
0.06 
(0.41) 
Equity 
Value 
1.00 
0.17 
(0.23) 
1.00 
0.07 
(0.37) 
0.10 
(0.33) 
Debt 
Value 
1.00 
1.00 
0.10 1.00 
(0.34) 
Comm. Dis. 
Comte Index 
^h 
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(Cont.) Table 4: Correlation Profiles 
Comm. 
Comte 
Dis. 
Index 
-0.14 
(0.28) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.27 
(0.12) 
0.05 
(0.42) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.43) 
-0.10 
(0.34) 
-0.31* 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(0.29) 
0.06 
(0.41) 
-0.02 
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.33* 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.38) 
1.00 
0.03 
(0.44) 
1.00 
Significant at the 0.01 level 
Significant at the 0.05 level 
Significant at the 0.10 level 
HI; certain corporate governance mechanisms play an important role in emerging markets, 
which in turn can contribute to improved operations and economic profits. 
Hypothesis H2 stated the amount of corporate disclosure would significantly explain 
regulators decision to suspend companies from KLSE. Tables 1 and 2 (Panel A) finds 
evidence to the contrary, the PN 4 companies disclose significantly (at the 0.09 level) more 
than the good companies. This should not be surprising because the corporate insiders 
in the PN 4 companies would have anticipated to being closely monitored, and hence, 
taken steps such as strengthening the audit committee and increasing the amount of 
disclosures. It is interesting that the volume of their disclosures is not significantly 
different than that of the negative economic profit companies, which have the highest 
amount of disclosures. Therefore, though there is no support for H2, the results support 
the notion that when problems of moral hazards increase, the corporate insiders and 
regulators consider disclosures to be an alternative governance mechanism that can 
improve monitoring by outsiders. 
Hypothesis H3 stated that the means used to raise capital would be a significant 
factor that explains regulators decisions to suspend companies from KLSE. Table 2 Panel 
B, shows evidence that support this hypothesis. The PN 4 companies have significantly 
higher (at the 0.05 level) amount of debt compared to the good companies. The model in 
this table also supports the view that this combination creates extreme agency costs, 
which significantly (at the 0.08 level) depresses the equity value of the PN 4 companies 
relative to the well managed companies. Table 3 Panel B, also provides evidence that 
supports hypothesis H3, and reinforces the agency cost explanation for the depressed 
equity values of PN 4 companies. As per the results, the PN 4 companies have significantly 
higher insider ownership and debt (both at the 0.05 level), and significantly lower (at the 
0.06 level) equity values compared to the negative economic profit companies. Therefore, 
the extreme agency costs being the reason why PN 4 companies are in trouble is strong. 
The final hypothesis H4 stated that the availability of growth opportunities to 
companies is a significant factor that explains regulators decisions to suspend companies 
from the KLSE. When comparing PN 4 companies versus the positive economic profit 
companies, there is partial evidence to support this hypothesis. Table 2 Panel B shows 
that asset growth is an important predictor of PN 4 companies versus the good companies; 
such evidence does not exist when comparing PN 4 companies to the negative economic 
profit companies5. Interestingly, Table 4 correlations show that, unlike the rest of the 
companies, well-managed companies do not rely on debt to grow their assets either. 
^ ^ 
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Conclusion 
Malaysia is probably the only country where companies are temporarily suspended from 
trading, and given a second chance. This gave us an opportunity to explore how and why 
the suspended (or PN 4) companies got themselves into trouble. Particularly, we 
investigated how the corporate governance mechanisms including weak disclosures and 
poor growth management may have raised the 'red flags' among the securities regulators, 
bringing about more monitoring to reduce the agency costs to outside shareholders. In 
order for comparisons with troubled companies to be made, we created three groups; 
companies with positive economic profit, negative economic profit, and the PN 4 group of 
companies. In the literature review, we argued that the later two groups that had destroyed 
shareholder value had governance structures that were less optimal than companies 
generating positive economic profits. The arguments were based on agency theory studies 
that have shown that limited disclosures about the clarity of company activities and 
performance increases the demand on corporate governance systems to alleviate moral 
hazard problems that result from the information gap between managers, corporate insiders 
and outside shareholders (e.g., Bushman et al., 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; and 
LaPortaetal, 1998; 2003). 
We suggest that the poor corporate governance combined with extreme amounts of 
debt and poor growth management was the recipe for trouble, which in-turn may attract 
regulators, attention. To test this proposition, we developed four hypotheses and tested 
it using secondary data. We found that corporate governance mechanisms such as role 
duality and board compensation committee created value for companies traded on the 
KLSE. More importantly, we found that companies in trouble tend to appoint non-executive 
directors on the board to the audit committee to reduce agency costs, and increase their 
disclosures. Additionally, PN 4 companies also carried the heaviest debt burden and 
incurred the extreme agency costs in terms of the lowest equity values. Thus, being 
subject to be monitored by regulators is probably one of the ways of showing willingness 
to reduce the agency costs to minority shareholders by engaging in asset and debt 
restructuring. 
The study's contribution is that it reinforces the findings of previous research, showing 
the importance of good corporate government mechanisms for creating value for minority 
shareholders in emerging markets. It also highlights how insiders of poorly performing 
companies use some of the governance mechanisms, including disclosures, to lower 
costs of raising debt and equity. Regulators can perform their monitoring tasks more 
effectively if they proactively monitor the combined 'red flags' such as misaligned asset 
and sales growth, poor corporate governance, weak disclosures and the debt burden of 
listed companies. A recent article by Shanmugan and Siow (2004) reported that YCS Corp 
Bhd., which was a PN 4 company whose restructuring plan was approved and had begun 
trading on KLSE, was reclassified again in the PN4 list two years after completing its 
restructuring, because it defaulted on interest payments. It happens to be that the examples 
of PN 4 companies restructuring failures given by Shanmugan and Siow were using debts 
as the major source of finance in their original restructuring, and many such companies 
continued to have below par share prices. This finding lends credibility to La Porta et al's. 
(2003) suggestion that restructuring by issuing short-term private debt in capital markets 
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that inhibit price signals are not likely to provide confidence to outsiders, and help reduce 
the moral hazard problems. We encourage future research to test the validity of factors 
that improve long-term performance governance under different market, institutional, and 
regulator settings. 
Our findings are limited because of the small sample of PN 4 companies we were able 
to study, and the corresponding limited control firms we used to compare them to. 
Unfortunately, the laws suspending companies from trading is new, and there are not 
many companies on the KLSE that generate a positive/negative economic profit with 
similar characteristics to draw from as a control group either. This also limits the possibility 
of using widely used tools such as Tobin's Q to compare and contrast firms that are 
significantly different in terms of value creation. Despite these limitations, given the lack 
of strong bankruptcy laws in many emerging markets to protect outsiders, it is important 
to conduct studies to investigate interdependent factors that strengthen or weaken price 
signals in less than efficient capital markets. 
Notes 
1
 We chose this measure over commonly used measures of Tobin's Q to rank companies 
because few companies in our sample had negative net worth. 
2
 Para. 13.8.1 of the KLSE Listing Requirement requires all listed companies to have an 
audit committee with at least three members shall comprise independent directors. 
3
 These include OECD White Paper on Corporate Governance in Asia (2003); the IFAC 
Credibility Report (2003); Australian Stock Exchange's Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (2003); Standard & Poors (2000); 
Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, 2001; Blue Ribbon Committee Report of USA (1999); 
Ernst and Young's Report on Corporate Governance (2002); and the Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance (2000). 
4
 According to Demaris (1992), under this method all variables are initially entered and 
then at each step variables are evaluated for removal, and the removal testing is 
based on the probability of the likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic based on the maximum-
likelihood estimates. The higher the -2Log LR the more likely the variable will not be 
removed. 
5
 We performed logistic regressions that included governance, financial, and valuation 
variables together in a model. Similar to Table 4 Panel B, Insider ownership was the 
only governance variable along with debt and equity value that help predicts these 
two groups. However, we were not successful in comparing PN 4 versus good 
companies with all variables in a single model because after twenty iterations it failed. 
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of external audit and major findings 
of external audit investigations are 
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outlined 
c. Q] Information on non-audit fees are 
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d. Q Notes on accounting policies 
and related principles are 
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Notes on external auditors, scope Q Q 
and nature of external audit and 
major findings of external audit 
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Notes on financial calendars are \^\ Q 
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Notes on accounting policies Q Q 
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Notes on interim review of the Q Q 
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and nature of external audit and 
major findings of external audit 
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not outlined 
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Notes on accounting policies 
and principles are not explained 
Notes on interim review of the 
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